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CLEARING THE AIR: DOES CHOOSING AGENCY
DEFERENCE IN SECURITY CLEARANCE RULINGS
DILUTE CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES?
By: Frank Russo+
The ability to obtain a security clearance has a wide-ranging impact from job
placement to questions of fitness in a presidential election. Sustaining a
functional career in intelligence, national security, and many other federal fields
within the United States is nearly impossible without proper security clearance.1
In 2016, the importance of proper clearance evolved into a national debate as
each presidential candidate staked claims that their opposition should be
excluded from receiving sensitive material.2 Democratic presidential nominee
and former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton was accused of mishandling
classified information while serving as Secretary of State, leading Congress to
introduce a bill removing the nominee’s clearance.3 Her opponent, Republican
nominee and current U.S. President Donald J. Trump, faced mounting criticism
over his ability to keep sensitive information secret, leading to calls for the
nominee to be denied customary national security briefings.4 As the election
process brought security clearance procedures into the public eye, the mundane
bureaucratic chatter surrounding the subject turned to polarizing debates within
a national election. Following the election, the discussions surrounding security
clearances did not subside as White House officials were accused of violating
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1. See All About Security Clearances, DEP’T STATE, http://www.state.gov/m/ds/clearances/
c10978.htm (last visited Feb. 6, 2018).
2. See, e.g., Ivan Levingston, Intelligence Briefings Become Flashpoint for Trump and
Clinton Campaigns, CNBC (Aug. 5, 2016, 3:17 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/2016/08/05/intelligen
ce-briefings-become-flashpoint-for-trump-and-clinton-campaigns.html (“‘I don’t think it’s safe to
have Hillary Clinton be briefed on national security because the word will get out’ Trump said.”).
3. Katie Bo Williams, House Bill Would Revoke Clinton’s Security Clearance, THE HILL
(July 7, 2016, 2:34 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/national-security/287247-house-bill-would-revo
ke-clintons-security-clearance.
4. Leigh Ann Caldwell & Robert Windrem, Could Candidate Donald Trump Be Denied
National Security Briefings?, NBC NEWS (July 29, 2016, 4:01 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/pol
itics/2016-election/could-candidate-donald-trump-be-denied-national-security-briefings-n619156.
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standard clearance procedures.5 Political opponents of President Trump
introduced legislation to revoke the clearance of senior White House advisers.6
Despite growing attention from politicians and national media, little scholarship
has been produced examining the federal judiciary’s role in handling national
security clearance disputes.
Federal government agencies dictate the terms of security clearance
procedures including application review, denial, and acceptance.7 Similarly,
agency heads are responsible for establishing revocation procedures.8 A loss of
a security clearance at an agency is almost always followed by loss of
employment.9 An employee is able to appeal a revocation to the Merit Systems
Protection Board (MSPB or the Board).10 The Supreme Court first addressed
this process in Department of Navy v. Egan,11 deciding that the MSPB was
correct in refusing to review the substance and evidentiary conclusions of an
agency’s security clearance revocation decision.12 Additionally, the Supreme
Court refused to conduct its own substantive review of the revocation.13
The decision in Egan has defined security clearance jurisprudence over the
past three decades.14 Two competing camps have materialized since the Egan
precedent took hold of security clearance jurisprudence. The first advocates for
the federal judiciary to strictly follow the administrative decisions and deny
substantive reviews of security clearance decisions and procedures.15
Supporters of the Egan decision reason that national security concerns outweigh
the constitutional considerations of a security clearance decision and, therefore,
should not be questioned by the federal judiciary.16 Whereas, critics of the Egan
5. See, e.g., Katie Bo Williams & Jordan Fabian, Questions Grow Over Kushner’s Security
Clearances, THE HILL (July 17, 2017, 6:00 AM), http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/3421
20-questions-grow-over-kushners-security-clearances (“Calls for [Jared] Kushner to lose his
security clearance have mounted . . . .”).
6. Igor Bobic, Republicans Block Effort to Revoke Jared Kushner’s Security Clearance,
HUFFINGTON POST (July 13, 2017, 1:04 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/jared-kushne
r-security-clearance_us_596783aae4b0a0c6f1e67433 (describing a proposed amendment revoking
security clearances for Kushner and White House Staff who “deliberately fail to disclose meetings
with foreign nationals.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
7. Exec. Order No. 12,968, 3 C.F.R. 391, 392, 397 (1995).
8. Id. at 397, 399–400.
9. Katrina J. Church, Loss or Denial of Security Clearance: An Employee’s Rights, 4 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 197, 198 (1988).
10. 5 U.S.C. § 7513(d) (2006) (“An employee against whom an action is taken under this
section is entitled to appeal to the Merit System Protection Board . . . .”).
11. 484 U.S. 518 (1988).
12. See id. at 529–32.
13. Id. at 529–34.
14. See Charles Pollack, Comment, A Delicate Balance: Federal Employees, Security
Clearances, and the Role of the Federal Circuit, 23 FED. CIR. B.J. 133, 147 (2013) (“The Supreme
Court has not clarified how Egan should limit Federal Circuit review since the late 1980s.”).
15. See, e.g., id. at 135 (arguing for a limited judicial review of security clearance denials).
16. See id. Mr. Pollack notes:
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decision argue that legislative changes are needed to expand the federal
judiciary’s role in reviewing security clearance revocation procedures.17 These
critics claim federal employees in the security field deserve a thorough process
that includes a substantive review of both the procedures and explanations
behind a clearance revocation or denial.18
Each approach exhibits the friction that exists between constitutional rights
and national security concerns when reviewing security clearance disputes.19
However, both camps overvalue one aspect of the divide that would lead the
respective approaches to damage the federal judiciary’s role in security
clearance jurisprudence. This Comment advocates for a third approach, first
explored in the concurring opinion of Hegab v. Long,20 where the federal
judiciary should only conduct substantive reviews of the policies underlying a
security clearance revocation when there is a constitutional challenge against a
specific procedure or rule.21 Precedent established in Webster v. Doe,22 decided
in the same year as Egan, allows courts to review constitutional challenges to
national security employment policies, while not encroaching the boundaries of
national security power vested in the other branches of government.23
This Comment begins with a detailed history of modern security clearance
procedures and MSPB reviews of clearance revocations. Part I focuses on those
who need security clearances and how these clearances can be obtained, denied,
or revoked. Part I then concludes with a review of the statutorily defined MSPB
rules and procedures. In Part II, the conflict between due process rights and
national security concerns is explored. Part II finishes with an overview of the
two modern arguments, one side advocating for due process versus the other
advocating for national security. Part III centers on a detailed explanation of the
third approach addressed in Hegab by offering a new way forward for judicial
review of security clearances that shows how the limited expansion of the federal
Supreme Court precedents make substantive review on national security issues
unnecessary because the federal government ultimately has the responsibility to “provide
for the common defense, [and] promote the general Welfare of all citizens.” These
responsibilities require that the President and Congress make national security decisions,
and the Supreme Court has consequently affirmed that such determinations are not suited
for the judiciary.
Id. at 134 (footnotes omitted).
17. See, e.g., Nadia A. Patel, You’re Fired! Egan and MSPB Review of Security Clearance
Decisions, 21 FED. CIR. B.J. 93, 94 (2011) (arguing for an amendment to the Civil Service Reform
Act “to expressly authorize the MSPB to review the merits of security clearance denials that are
the basis of adverse employment actions”).
18. See id. at 101.
19. See Pollack, supra note 14, at 134; see also Patel, supra note 17, at 94.
20. 716 F.3d 790 (4th Cir. 2013) (holding that an employee at the National Geospatial
Intelligence Agency was not entitled to a review after his clearance was revoked upon discovery of
his marriage to a woman identified as a foreign national).
21. Id. at 797–98 (Motz, J., concurring).
22. 486 U.S. 592 (1988).
23. See id. at 603–05.
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judiciary’s role in security clearance revocation protects both constitutional due
process and national security interests. Part IV concludes by reinforcing the
need for greater attention in security clearance jurisprudence throughout
academia.
I. AMERICAN HISTORY SHAPES THE PROCESSES FOR SECURITY CLEARANCE IN
MODERN TIMES
A. The Value of a Clearance
The United States has placed significant emphasis on protecting vital national
security information through legislation and executive orders beginning with the
passage of the Civil Service Act of 1883, which required individuals seeking
federal employment to be of “good” character, reputation, and fitness.24 In
modern times, federal agencies rely on security clearances to ensure their
employees meet the standards required to handle and protect sensitive
information.25 Essentially, the need for clearances is driven by two principles:
protection and secrecy.26 Protecting sensitive information is vital to the federal
government’s ability to handle diplomatic negotiations and military actions.27
Secrecy, in theory, also incentivizes bureaucrats to debate policy without fear of
public retribution when discussing sensitive material with fellow decisionmakers.28
Security clearances are also of significant importance to individuals seeking
employment in the federal government. Employees holding clearances earn, on
average, twenty-two percent more than individuals who do not.29 In addition to
the financial benefit, individuals who are able to earn a clearance have greater
employment prospects because the pool of cleared agency and intelligence
community (IC) workers is shrinking.30 Security clearances are an integral part
24. William Henderson, A Brief History of the U.S. Personnel Security Program,
CLEARANCEJOBS (June 29, 2009), https://news.clearancejobs.com/2009/06/29/a-brief-history-ofthe-u-s-personnel-security-program/; see also Civil Service Act of 1883, Jan. 16, 1883, ch. 27, 22
Stat. 403.
25. MICHELLE D. CHRISTENSEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., SECURITY CLEARANCE PROCESS:
ANSWERS TO FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 1 (2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/secrecy/R43216.p
df.
26. See Patel, supra note 17, at 95.
27. Harvard Law Review Association, Information Security: Classification of Government
Documents, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1191 (1972) [hereinafter Information Security].
28. Id. at 1191–92 (“If an official knows that his recommendations will shortly be made
public, there is a danger that he might hedge his advice in order to avoid embarrassing his superiors
or to attract favorable public attention to himself, thus injuring the governmental interest in
exposing decisionmakers to a broad range of viewpoints.”).
29. Katherine Walsh, Security Clearances Worth an Extra $19k Per Year?, CSO (Apr. 11,
2008, 8:00 AM), http://www.csoonline.com/article/2122323/it-careers/numbers—-security-cleara
nces-worth-an-extra—19k-per-year-.html.
30. See NAT’L COUNTERINTELLIGENCE & SEC. CTR., 2015 ANNUAL REPORT ON SECURITY
CLEARANCE DETERMINATIONS 1, 5, 7, 12–13 (2015), https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/News
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of federal employment and the work bureaucrats do on a daily basis, which begs
the question: how did clearances come to play such a significant role in our
government, and how has the process for obtaining clearance changed over
time?
B. The History of Security Clearances
Safe guarding sensitive information came to the forefront of the American
legislative focus following the outbreak of World War I (WWI).31 The first
system of classification was borne from the American Expeditionary Force
procedures established for handling classified information during WWI.32
Sensitive documents were separated into groups labeled “Secret,”
“Confidential,” or “For Official Circulation Only.”33 Following WWI, Congress
expanded the Executive’s authority to control sensitive national security
information within the military, and established criminal punishments for the
dissemination of information without executive permission.34 President Dwight
D. Eisenhower further extended such authority to include civilian agencies in
1951, effectively giving the Executive Branch exclusive control over regulating
the procedures for the handling of sensitive information.35
Through the last century, executive orders have regularly modified security
clearance standards and procedures.36 Under the current system, sensitive
information and clearances are separated into three levels: “Top secret,”
“Secret,” and “Confidential.”37 Additionally, each agency head classifies

room/Reports%20and%20Pubs/2015-Annual_Report_on_Security_Clearance_Determinations.pd
f.
31. See Information Security, supra note 27, at 1193 (“The outbreak of World War I prompted
the passage of the Espionage Act of 1917, which spelled out the offenses [of national security
violations] in greater detail, increased the severity of the penalties, and added new provisions
dealing with acts of espionage in time of war.”); see also Espionage Act of 1917, ch. 30, 40 Stat.
217.
32. Information Security, supra note 27, at 1193.
33. Id.
34. See Espionage Act of 1938, ch. 2, § 1, 52 Stat. 3.
35. See Exec. Order No. 10,450, 3 C.F.R. 73 (1953).
36. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,968, 3 C.F.R. 391 (1995) (establishing a uniform, federal
program to gain access to classified information); Exec. Order No. 12,356, 47 Fed. Reg. 14,874
(Apr. 2, 1982) (establishing a uniform system to classify and declassify national security
information); Exec. Order No. 12,065, 3 C.F.R. 190 (1978) (establishing a system to classify
information as Top Secret, Secret, and Confidential); Exec. Order No. 11,652, 37 Fed. Reg. 5209
(Mar. 10, 1972) (establishing a monitoring system to classify and declassify information).
37. Exec. Order No. 11,652, 37 Fed. Reg. 5209, 5209–10 (Mar. 10, 1972). Executive Order
11,652 provides: (1) “Top Secret” shall be applied to information if its “unauthorized disclosure
could reasonably be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security”; (2)
“Secret” shall be applied to information if its “unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be
expected to cause serious damage to the national security”; and (3) “Confidential” shall be applied
to information if its “unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause damage to the
national security.” Id.
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employment positions within their department as either “Special-Sensitive,”
“Critical-Sensitive,” or “Noncritical-Sensitive.”38 Previously, the Federal
Investigative Services (FIS) handled ninety-five percent of federal background
checks39 with the Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office (DISCO)
handling Department of Defense (DOD) related security clearances.40 In 2016,
the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) established a new department, the National Background
Investigations Bureau (NBIB), to handle security clearance procedures and
background checks.41 According to the White House, the NBIB will be led by
a presidential appointee who is responsible for overseeing the newly established
agency and engaging in collaborative efforts with the DOD to ensure a smooth
transition to the new system.42 The NBIB works directly with existing DOD
databases to conduct background checks as well as implement new security
procedures for safeguarding the information collected during the check.43
C. Security Clearance Procedures
Individuals seeking employment that requires access to classified information
must gain a proper security clearance prior to beginning the occupation.44
38. See 5 C.F.R. § 732.201(a) (2017) (explaining that the head of each agency classifies “any
position within the department or agency the occupant of which could bring about, by virtue of the
nature of the position, a material adverse effect on the national security as a sensitive position at
one of three sensitivity levels”); see also Marko Hakamaa, Position Designation and the Type of
Investigation Required, CLEARANCEJOBS (Aug. 4, 2014), https://news.clearancejobs.com/2014/0
8/04/position-designation-type-investigation-required/ (explaining that the classification is based
on (1) the level of risk the position poses to the agency or government and (2) what and how much
sensitive classified material will the employee be handling).
39. Nicole Ogrysko, OPM, OMB to Stand Up New Agency, Director to Own Security
Clearance Process, FEDERAL NEWS RADIO (Jan. 22, 2016, 11:50 AM), http://federalnewsradio.c
om/opm-cyber-breach/2016/01/opm-announces-major-update-to-security-clearance-policy/.
40. William H. Henderson, Security Clearance Frequently Asked Questions,
CLEARANCEJOBS, https://www.clearancejobs.com/security_clearance_faq.pdf (last visited Sept. 7,
2017).
41. Jamal Brown, Modernizing & Strengthening the Security & Effectiveness of Federal
Background Investigations, WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Jan. 22, 2016, 11:00 AM), https://www.white
house.gov/blog/2016/01/22/modernizing-strengthening-security-effectiveness-federalbackground-investigations. Additional changes include:
1. [e]stablishing a five-year reinvestigation requirement for all individuals with a
security clearance, regardless of the level of access;
2. [r]educing the number of individuals with active security clearances by 17 percent;
3. [l]aunching programs to continuously evaluate personnel with security clearances to
determine whether that individual continues to meet the requirements for eligibility; and
4. [d]eveloping recommendations to enhance information sharing between State, local,
and Federal Law Enforcement entities when conducting background investigations.
Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. See All About Security Clearances, supra note 1.
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President Eisenhower established the procedures for receiving a clearance in
1960.45 The structural layout in Executive Order 10,865 (the Order) allowed for
the DOD and other government agencies to conduct background checks prior to
employing an individual who would handle sensitive information.46 Obtaining
the required level of clearance entails going through a background check
conducted by the appropriate agency.47 Individuals cannot obtain a security
clearance on their own, instead sponsorship is required from a contractor or
federal agency.48 Once a prospective employee receives sponsorship or a
“conditional offer of employment,” the individual must fill out a “Standard Form
86” security questionnaire, which is reviewed by the sponsoring agency’s human
resources department for inconsistencies.49 Under the current structure, DOD
clearances are handled by DISCO, and agencies that do not require a DOD
clearance must file the applicant information with the NBIB to continue the
investigation.50 If approved, the agency and NBIB then require the individual
to meet with an investigator at least once, and may require additional meetings
or polygraphs depending on the level of clearance required.51 The final decision
to grant or deny the clearance falls on the agency or department in consultation
with the NBIB.52

45. Exec. Order No. 10,865, 3 C.F.R. 62 (1960), amended by Exec. Order No. 10,909, 3
C.F.R. 75 (1961).
46. Id.; see also Church, supra note 9, at 200–01 (“[Executive Order 10,865] sets the
framework for the ‘Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program,’ which is
administered by the Department of Defense, and equivalent programs administered by other
Government agencies.”).
47. All About Security Clearances, supra note 1; see also Brown, supra note 41 (explaining
that a majority of background checks are conducted by the newly formed NBIB agency).
48. Henderson, supra note 40.
49. All About Security Clearances, supra note 1. The stated purpose of the Standard Form 86
is as follows:
This [Standard Form 86] will be used by the United States (U.S.) Government in
conducting background investigations, reinvestigations, and continuous evaluations of
persons under consideration for, or retention of, national security positions as defined in
5 CFR 732, and for individuals requiring eligibility for access to classified information
under Executive Order 12968. This form may also be used by agencies in determining
whether a subject performing work for, or on behalf of, the Government under a contract
should be deemed eligible for logical or physical access when the nature of the work to
be performed is sensitive and could bring about an adverse effect on the national security.
U.S. OFFICE OF PERS. MGMT., OMB No. 3206-0005, QUESTIONNAIRE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
POSITIONS 1 (2010).
50. See Henderson, supra note 40; Brown, supra note 41.
51. See All About Security Clearances, supra note 1; see also Passing the Polygraph,
MILITARY.COM, http://www.military.com/veteran-jobs/security-clearance-jobs/passing-polygrap
h.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2018).
52. See 32 C.F.R. § 147.2(b) (2016); see also Brown, supra note 41.
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The second section of the Order addresses the process required when revoking
or denying a security clearance.53 The Order specifies the minimum Due
Process requirements for the removal of a clearance:
1. [A] written statement of reasons why access to classified
information may be denied or revoked (“Statement of Reasons”);
2. [A]n opportunity to reply in writing;
3. [A]n opportunity for a hearing after filing a written reply to the
Statement of Reasons;
4. [R]easonable time to prepare for the hearing;
5. [T]he opportunity to be represented by counsel;
6. [T]he opportunity to cross-examine persons on any matters (with a
limitation on the disclosure of classified information) raised in the
Statement of Reasons, other than the characterization of any
organization or individual other than the applicant; and
7. [W]ritten notice of the final decision concerning the allegations
contained in the Statement of Reasons.54
Initially, the Order specified the Secretary of Defense as the individual in
charge of handling the revocation process or delegating revocation procedures.55
However, under the current format, each federal agency handles its own
processes and adjudications consistent with the minimum requirements set out
in the Order.56
Although not all processes are the same, each agency follows a basic format.
Once a security clearance is denied or revoked, the agency will issue a
“Statement of Reason” (SOR) or a similar letter of intent to the individual, which
contains factual explanations for the denial or revocation.57 Agencies may
explain within the SOR why granting the clearance would be inconsistent with
national security concerns.58 If the individual is pursuing an appeal, they are
then required to respond to the SOR and agency decision in writing.59 All
applicants appealing a revocation or denial are “entitled to an oral hearing, which
they must request in their written response to the SOR. Hearings are trial-like
53. Exec. Order No. 10,865, 3 C.F.R. 62 (1960), amended by Exec. Order No. 10,909, 3
C.F.R. 75 (1961); see also Church, supra note 9, at 201 (discussing the Order’s minimum
standards).
54. Church, supra note 9, at 201 (citing Exec. Order No. 10,865 § 3).
55. See id.
56. See John V. Berry, I’m a Lawyer Specializing in Security Clearance Cases. Hillary
Clinton Got Off Easy, WASH. POST (July 7, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/ima-lawyer-specializing-in-security-clearance-cases-hillary-clinton-got-off-easy/2016/07/07/3810f3
c-4480-11e6-bc99-7d269f8719b1_story.html?utm_term=.f5d6b5ec9578.
57. A Summary of the Security Clearance Appeals Process, BERRY & BERRY PLLC (Nov. 8,
2013), http://www.berrylegal.com/resources/A_Summary_of_the_Security_Clearance_Appeals_P
rocess/ [hereinafter BERRY & BERRY PLLC].
58. See Patel, supra note 17, at 99.
59. BERRY & BERRY PLLC, supra note 57.
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proceedings conducted before administrative law judges.”60 Following the
written response and, if requested, oral hearing, the agency’s adjudicator will rereview the individual’s application and decide whether to overturn the denial,
uphold the agency’s decision, or request further information.61 If the
employment position in question requires access to sensitive information, the
revocation or denial of a clearance will cost the individual his or her job.62
D. U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board Review
Federal government employees who lose clearance following the agency
adjudication process are left with limited options for appeal.63 The Civil Service
Reform Act (CSRA) permits government personnel to appeal security clearance
revocation or adverse employment decisions to the MSPB for judicial review.64
The MSPB serves as the independent agency responsible for addressing
questions regarding the federal merit systems.65 However, it does not provide
hearings for government employees on issues such as discrimination complaints,
unfair labor complaints, adverse employment decisions unrelated to clearance
revocation, or activities prohibited by civil service regulations.66 Government
employees facing adverse employment effects from a clearance revocation may
petition the regional MSPB Board within thirty days of the agency’s decision.67
The appellant has the option of receiving representation before the MSPB
appoints an administrative law judge (ALJ) to review the petition.68
Once an appeal is filed, the ALJ alerts both petitioner-appellant and the
agency of the impending review.69 The ALJ is responsible for holding pre60. See Patel, supra note 17, at 99 (footnote omitted).
61. BERRY & BERRY PLLC, supra note 57.
62. Church, supra note 9, at 198.
63. Id. at 214.
64. See Patel, supra note 17, at 94; see also Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No.
94-454, § 204(a), 92 Stat. 1111, 1137–38.
65. See About MSPB, U.S. MERIT SYS. PROTECTION BOARD, http://www.mspb.gov/a
bout/about.htm (last visited Feb. 6, 2018).
The Merit Systems Protection Board is an independent, quasi-judicial agency in the
Executive branch that serves as the guardian of Federal merit systems. The Board was
established by Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1978, which was codified by the Civil
Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA), Public Law No. 95-454. . . .
....
. . . MSPB carries out its statutory responsibilities and authorities primarily by
adjudicating individual employee appeals and by conducting merit systems studies. In
addition, MSPB reviews the significant actions of the Office of Personnel Management
(OPM) to assess the degree to which those actions may affect merit.
Id.
66. Id.
67. See How to File an Appeal, U.S. MERIT SYS. PROTECTION BOARD, http://www.mspb.g
ov/appeals/appeals.htm (last visited Feb. 6, 2018).
68. Id.
69. Id.
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hearing conferences and a full hearing on matters of both fact and law.70 Once
the hearing is complete, the ALJ will issue an initial decision that can be
appealed to the MSPB or directly to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit.71 If the petitioner-appellant appeals to the MSPB, a three Board member
panel reviews the case and issues a final decision.72 Finally, the employee’s
options are only exhausted once an appeal of the MPSB decision is made to the
Federal Circuit.73 The federal judiciary has been forced to grapple with
competing precedent when defining its role in addressing security clearance
denials and revocations that involve alleged constitutional violations.
II. DEBATE WAGES OVER THE JUDICIARY’S ROLE IN SECURITY CLEARANCE
JURISPRUDENCE
A. The Egan Decision: Defining National Security Jurisprudence
In 1981, Thomas Egan lost his job as a civilian employee for the Navy when
his security clearance application was denied because he failed to disclose prior
convictions for federal gun charges.74 Egan responded by appealing the denial—
first through the Department of the Navy, and then through the MSPB.75 The
Board accepted Egan’s appeal as a result of the disparate employment decision
that resulted from the failure to acquire a security clearance.76 During the
hearing, the government stated the MSPB had limited ability to review the case
because “the Board did not have the authority to judge the merits of the
underlying security-clearance determination.”77 Initially, a MSPB official
reversed the Navy’s decision, requiring the department to explain the specific
reasons for denying the clearance and prove that those reasons were reasonably
related to national security concerns.78 However, the Navy was granted a review
of that decision by the full Board in which the Board unanimously held that the
statutory language and legislative history of the enabling statute did not require

70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See id.
74. See Dep’t of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 521 (1988) (“[T]he Director of the Naval
Civilian Personnel Command issued a letter of intent to deny respondent a security clearance. This
was based upon California and Washington state criminal records reflecting respondent’s
convictions for assault and for being a felon in possession of a gun, and further based upon his
failure to disclose on his application for federal employment two earlier convictions for carrying a
loaded firearm. The Navy also referred to respondent’s own statements that he had had drinking
problems in the past and had served the final 28 days of a sentence in an alcohol rehabilitation
program.”).
75. Id. at 522.
76. Id. at 522–23.
77. Id. at 523.
78. Id.
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or authorize a review of clearance decisions.79 Egan petitioned to the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which reversed the MSPB’s final decision.80
When elevated to the Supreme Court, the Court granted cert and reversed the
Federal Circuit’s decision following a review of the statutory language and
national security concerns that clearly attach to security clearance procedures
and policies.81 In examining Egan’s claim, the Court’s explanation for the
decision was two-fold. Reviewing the language of § 7513, Justice Blackmun
stated a clearance denial or revocation did not amount to an “adverse action” as
defined in the statute.82 The Court concluded there was no “right” to a clearance,
and therefore, the decision to grant or revoke such a clearance “requires an
affirmative act of discretion on the part of the granting official.”83 In explaining
the Court’s deference, Justice Blackmun posited:
A clearance does not equate with passing judgment upon an
individual’s character. Instead, it is only an attempt to predict his
possible future behavior and to assess whether, under compulsion of
circumstances or for other reasons, he might compromise sensitive
information. It may be based, to be sure, upon past or present conduct,
but it also may be based upon concerns completely unrelated to
conduct, such as having close relatives residing in a country hostile to
the United States. “[T]o be denied [clearance] on unspecified grounds
in no way implies disloyalty or any other repugnant characteristic.”84
The broad discretion standard adopted by the Court was also rooted in national
security concerns within the power of the Executive.85 When handling national
79. Id. at 524 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 7512 (1978)).
80. Id. at 525.
81. Id. at 525–30.
Presidents, in a series of Executive Orders, have sought to protect sensitive information
and to ensure its proper classification throughout the Executive Branch by delegating this
responsibility to the heads of agencies. . . .
It should be obvious that no one has a “right” to a security clearance. The grant of a
clearance requires an affirmative act of discretion on the part of the granting official. The
general standard is that a clearance may be granted only when “clearly consistent with
the interests of the national security.”
Id. at 528.
82. Id. at 530. Noting this, one commentator explained:
[T]he Court explained that a denial of a security clearance is not an “adverse action” and,
thus, is not subject to Board review. The statute specifically entitles employees
terminated for cause under § 7513 to procedural protections only, including
determination of (1) whether such cause existed, (2) whether in fact clearance was
denied, and (3) whether transfer to a non-sensitive position was feasible. Therefore,
according to the Court, the Board is not authorized to conduct further review into a
decision to deny or revoke a security clearance.
Patel, supra note 17, at 105 (footnotes omitted).
83. Egan, 484 U.S. at 528.
84. Id. at 528–29 (quoting Molerio v. FBI, 749 F.2d 815, 824 (1984)).
85. Id. at 527.
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security issues, “courts have traditionally shown the utmost deference to
Presidential responsibilities.”86 Relying on this principle and the statutory
language, the Egan Court set the tone for deference to agency decisions
involving security clearance decisions.87
B. Constitutional Claims in Security Clearance Jurisprudence
Following the holding in Egan, courts have refused to conduct substantive
reviews of security clearance decisions.88 Employees who lose employment as
a direct result of a denial or revocation of a security clearance are only able to
obtain a “surface” level review of the procedure, with no protection afforded
regarding the reasons or policies behind the decision.89 As a result of the Egan
decision, federal appellate courts have consistently ruled in favor of agencies
when clearance decisions are brought before them.90 This reluctance to question
agency judgment when reviewing the reasoning behind a clearance decision has
been apparent throughout modern clearance jurisprudence.
The Supreme Court failed to address how the appellate courts should handle
the constitutional questions and due process concerns in Egan. Following their
decision, the Supreme Court offered insight into these concerns in Webster v.
Doe.91 The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) revoked the clearance and
employment of an employee upon discovering that the individual was a
homosexual.92 The individual challenged the Agency’s decision on separate
86. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974).
87. Egan, 484 U.S. at 527.
88. Patel, supra note 17, at 105–07.
89. Id. at 106.
90. See, e.g., Carlucci v. Doe, 488 U.S. 93, 97–98 (1988) (involving a National Security
Agency employee who was fired under § 7532 when he disclosed homosexual relationships that
had occurred within the scope of his employment); Berry v. Conyers, 692 F.3d 1223, 1225, 1228–
29 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (involving two Department of Defense employees who were demoted and
eventually lost their jobs as a result of a failure to receive a security clearance); Skees v. Dep’t of
Navy, 864 F.2d 1576, 1577–79 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (involving an employee was terminated following
the denial of security clearance and an inability of the Navy to find an alternative position with the
department); Hegab v. Long, 716 F.3d 790, 791, 797 (4th Cir. 2013).
91. 486 U.S. 592, 594 (1988). As one commentator explained:
The Supreme Court has not clarified how Egan should limit Federal Circuit review since
the late 1980s. The most significant attempt appeared in Webster v. Doe, where a
distinction was made between security clearance issues and constitutional claims. . . .
The Court ruled that APA review was precluded because the employee’s security
clearance was terminated through CIA power granted under the National Security Act.
It determined that lower courts could hear other constitutional claims, however, not
otherwise prohibited by statute.
Pollack, supra note 14, at 147.
92. Webster, 486 U.S. at 595. The Court explained that Webster failed to allege an
unconstitutional policy had existed at the CIA:
We share the confusion of the Court of Appeals as to the precise nature of respondent’s
constitutional claims. It is difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain from the amended
complaint whether respondent contends that his termination, based on his homosexuality,
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grounds: that the decision violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and
that it deprived him of his Fifth Amendment Due Process and Equal Protection
rights.93 The Supreme Court refused to review the Agency’s decision under the
APA because the Agency satisfied the required “arbitrary and capricious
standard” in its decision-making.94
Again, relying on the statutory language and legislative intent, the Supreme
Court explained that the National Security Act, which granted the CIA the
authority to handle clearance and employment decisions, was clear in restricting
judicial review of agency decisions.95 However, the Supreme Court left the door
open for substantive review of constitutional claims.96
In the wake of the Egan and Doe decisions, the federal judiciary has struggled
to balance the broad discretion standard with the requirement to allow review of
constitutional claims.97 Security clearance questions pertaining to Fifth
is constitutionally impermissible, or whether he asserts that a more pervasive
discrimination policy exists in the CIA’s employment practices regarding all
homosexuals. This ambiguity in the amended complaint is no doubt attributable in part
to the inconsistent explanations respondent received from the Agency itself regarding his
termination. Prior to his discharge, respondent had been told by two CIA security officers
that his homosexual activities themselves violated CIA regulations. In contrast, the
Deputy General Counsel of the CIA later informed respondent that homosexuality was
merely a security concern that did not inevitably result in termination, but instead was
evaluated on a case-by-case basis.
Id. at 602.
93. Id. at 596.
94. See id. at 603–05.
95. Id. at 603.
96. Id. at 604–05 (“Petitioner also contends that even if respondent has raised a colorable
constitutional claim arising out of his discharge, Congress in the interest of national security may
deny the courts the authority to decide the claim and to order respondent’s reinstatement if the claim
is upheld . . . . [W]e do not think Congress meant to impose such restrictions when it enacted §
102(c) of the NSA. Even without such prohibitory legislation from Congress, of course, traditional
equitable principles requiring the balancing of public and private interests control the grant of
declaratory or injunctive relief in the federal courts.”).
97. Victor R. Donovan, Administrative and Judicial Review of Security Clearance Actions:
Post Egan, 35 A.F.L. REV. 323, 333–34 (1991) (explaining that although most courts err on the
side of heavy discretion in the agency’s favor, the federal judiciary has been unable to consistently
apply the Webster decision while affording significant weight to the agency’s final decision).
Additionally, federal courts have struggled to handle Title VII and other constitutional claims
involving security clearance procedures. Id. at 331–34. The article points specifically to the case
of Jamil v. Defense Mapping Agency, 910 F.2d 1203 (4th Cir. 1990), as an example of this issue,
stating:
It is questionable whether the Federal courts will allow Title VII attacks upon security
clearance actions. . . .
. . . In Jamil v. Defense Mapping Agency, the plaintiff appealed the revocation of his
security clearance and subsequent removal from employment for financial
irresponsibility. . . . Although Jamil conceded that Egan prevented the MSPP and the
Federal courts from hearing the merits of his security revocation, he argued he could still
challenge his revocation on the grounds that it violated other substantive laws [such as
Title VII], and that the agency failed to follow its own procedures. . . .
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Amendment Due Process and Equal Protection claims have been particularly
difficult for the courts to handle.98 The federal judiciary has been inconsistent
on handling Fifth Amendment claims in the context of security clearance
revocations and denials.99 The only consistency with constitutional claims is the
skepticism through which the court views alleged violations of Fifth
Amendment Due Process following a clearance removal.100 The judiciary’s
struggle to balance constitutional claims with the broad discretion standard has
led the courts to continue to favor deference to the agency.101 As agency
deference grows, criticism of the current standard as it pertains to employee
rights has risen in tandem.102
C. The Pitfalls of Judicial Deference
Skeptics of the Supreme Court’s holding in Egan take particular issue with
the lack of effective relief for an employee who faces an adverse employment
decision resulting from a security clearance denial.103 Further, without
protections, critics of the broad discretion standard worry agencies can abuse
clearance denials to effectively remove employees without scrutiny.104 Under
the current format, procedural failures by the agency are the only protection an
employee is afforded.105 The minimum requirements set by the court when
. . . The court specifically refused to reach the question of whether Egan would prevent
it from reviewing the revocation of a security clearance if Jamil had raised a genuine
issue of fact as to the existence of pretext. Although it refused to reach this question, the
court’s unwillingness to reiterate that this decision is beyond court review may indicate
it believes it could consider the merits of a revocation to determine whether it was
pretextual.
Id. at 331–32 (footnotes omitted).
98. Id. at 332–34.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 332 (“To date several federal circuits have considered whether constitutional
challenges to security clearance actions have survived Egan. Although the law in this area is still
being developed, the courts that have considered the issue have agreed that the merits of the
decision are not reviewable by a court or board. These courts have also agreed that substantive due
process attacks upon security clearance revocations are not well founded. What is less clear is
whether Egan allows courts to consider attacks upon security clearance actions based upon alleged
violations of equal protection guarantees.”).
101. See Patel, supra note 17, at 106–08.
102. Id. at 94 (“Egan is becoming increasingly relevant today. In 2010, the Board decided two
cases addressing whether Egan’s limitations should extend to adverse actions involving employees
in ‘non-critical sensitive’ positions. The Board has exhibited a willingness to broaden Egan’s
narrow jurisdictional limitation beyond review of security clearance denials or revocations to also
bar review of whether an employee can hold other sensitive positions. These cases highlight the
Boards tendency to allow the executive branch unchecked discretion regarding national security
decisions.”).
103. Id. at 105–07.
104. Id. at 106–08.
105. Id. at 107 (“[The current judicial review] is limited to procedural review of: (1) whether
a clearance was actually denied, (2) whether the position required the security clearance, and (3)

2018]

Clearing the Air

203

reviewing the agency’s effectiveness in following the appropriate processes can
be easily met if the agency allowed the employee to (1) receive notice of the
revocation and subsequent termination, (2) have an opportunity to respond, and
(3) obtain notice of the reasoning behind the decision—so long as the agency
does not invoke the national security exemption.106
Agencies are able to rely on the current standard to ensure the proper
procedures are followed in order to revoke or deny a clearance without providing
any significant insight into the reasoning.107 The current model could reasonably
incentivize agencies to make arbitrary or malicious employment decisions with
security clearances as the vehicle for such action. Additionally, those in
academia who are critical of the modern clearance jurisprudence point to the
lack of substantive evaluations as a restriction on alternative claims against a
revocation or denial.108 Without the ability to review a clearance revocation on
its merits, an employee is unable to bring forth additional statutory claims, such
as a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.109 As a result of these
restrictions, statutory alternatives have been proposed to remedy the broad
agency discretion.110
Critics of the modern clearance jurisprudence have offered amendments that
would alter the CSRA and the statutory scheme that currently precludes review
of MSPB clearance reviews.111 The most substantial change would allow meritwhether the statutory procedures in § 7513 were followed. . . . The Court’s three-pronged review
is superficial. The first two elements are questions of fact that the Board can answer simply by
looking at the record. These questions only provide protection from dishonest terminations, i.e., if
the agency terminates an employee when a security clearance was not actually required for the
position or if the security clearance was not actually denied. In most cases, though, this is not what
the employee disputes. An employee could claim that his position should not have required a
security clearance, but the Board cannot review that designation either. As a result, these two
questions provide little to no protection.”).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See id. at 107–12.
109. Id. at 108–09 (stating that without the ability to review the merits of a security clearance
decision, a court is unable to find a Title VII violation, and “[t]herefore, employees in protected
classes are unable to seek review of the underlying security clearance decisions that lead to their
terminations.”).
110. Id. at 114.
111. Id. (outlining a legislative change the CSRA to include merit based reviews and a twopart statutory scheme). The article proposes the following:
First, it should amend § 7512 to include adverse security clearance decisions in the list
of actions covered by the subchapter. Specifically, it should add “(6) a denial,
suspension, or revocation of a security clearance” after § 7512(5).
Second, Congress should amend § 7513 by adding a provision after § 7513(d) as follows:
(e) An employee whose termination under this section arises from the employee’s
security clearance being denied, suspended, or revoked is entitled to appeal to the Merit
Systems Protection Board under § 7701 of this title. The Merit Systems Protection Board
shall have the authority to review the merits of the decision denying, suspending, or
revoking the employee’s security clearance.
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based reviews of all security clearance decisions.112 Further, the offered change
in statutory language would allow the federal judiciary to have an expanded role
in reviewing MSPB decisions.113 The legislative change would explicitly
overrule the Supreme Court’s current view of post-Egan security clearance
jurisprudence.114
If Congress were to undertake such a legislative initiative, the new standard
would allow for all employees who face adverse employment decisions as a
result of a clearance denial or revocation to receive a full merit based review of
the agency’s decision.115 Moreover, the new approach would have the implied
effect of requiring judges to begin questioning agency decisions that involve
national security questions.116 Such a change would be a significant departure
from the judiciary’s modern position of deferring to the Executive Branch on
matters involving national security. However, skeptics of full merit based
review and increased judicial oversight have concerns that are rooted in the
belief that national security decisions are solely the prerogative of the
Executive.117
D. Justifying Agency Discretion
The Court’s deference to agency judgment is not without legitimate purpose
or reason. Although the current standard restricts an employee’s ability to obtain
review, courts are faced with the difficult challenge of balancing national
security interests. When reviewing security clearance jurisprudence, legal
scholars have noted that the current model respects the separation of powers by
following Congressional statutory language and preserving Executive control of
national security matters.118 Specifically, supporters of agency discretion
Id. (footnotes omitted).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 114–15.
114. See id. at 114.
115. Id.
116. See id. at 115.
117. Id.
118. Pollack, supra note 14, at 151–52; see also United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export, 299
U.S. 304, 318–19 (1936) (explaining that executive branch is the sole organ of national security).
In Curtiss-Wright Export, the Supreme Court explained:
The powers to declare and wage war, to conclude peace, to make treaties, to maintain
diplomatic relations with other sovereignties, if they had never been mentioned in the
Constitution, would have vested in the federal government as necessary concomitants of
nationality. . . .
....
. . . In this vast external realm, with its important, complicated, delicate and manifold
problems, the President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the
nation. He makes treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate; but he alone
negotiates. Into the field of negotiation the Senate cannot intrude; and Congress itself is
powerless to invade it.
Curtis-Wright Export, 299 U.S. at 318–19.
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believe that Egan and its progeny are consistent with the long standing Political
Question and State Action doctrines, as the court does not usurp its
constitutionally mandated authority.119 The argument by those in favor of full
agency deference, including on those issues involving constitutional claims, is
rooted in the belief that any expansion of judicial review would be in conflict
with separation of powers, which assigns national security powers to the
Executive Branch.120
Denying merit based reviews is not seen as a ploy to restrict employee rights
by supporters of the Court, but rather an attempt to uphold and protect
“constitutional principles.”121 Additionally, a concern exists that the judiciary
would be unable to handle sensitive national security questions involved in the
merits of a clearance, an area that courts do not have extensive expertise.122 The
Supreme Court admitted in Egan that it often does not possess the expertise to
handle those national security questions reserved for the Executive.123
Most controversially, supporters of modern clearance jurisprudence explain
that a distinction between Webster and Egan exists, allowing for courts to avoid
constitutional reviews of clearance denials or revocations.124 These scholars
claim that the Webster decision “merely concedes that the courts can hear
constitutional claims associated with an employee’s termination not otherwise
prohibited by statute” while still deferring to the agency’s discretion when
revoking a clearance.125 Therefore, courts can avoid answering constitutional
questions when security clearances are challenged.
The diverse viewpoints on both sides of the modern Egan debate demonstrate
the difficult issues courts face when deciding whether to review a security
clearance decision.126 Scholars who advocate for legislative change overlook
119. Pollack, supra note 14, at 151–52 (“The Egan decision plainly states that no person has a
‘right’ to a security clearance, and the grant of such a privilege must come from an official with
authority. Furthermore, such an order can only be granted when it is ‘clearly consistent with the
interests of the national security.’ National security interests and determinations are reserved for
executive and legislative branch resolution. . . . This ruling conforms to both the Political Question
and State Action Doctrines by keeping courts removed from national security determinations
reserved for the Executive.”).
120. Id. at 151–52.
121. Id. at 154.
122. Id.
123. Dep’t of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 529–30 (1988) (“Thus, unless Congress specifically
has provided otherwise, courts traditionally have been reluctant to intrude upon the authority of the
Executive in military and national security affairs.”).
124. Pollack, supra note 14, at 151–53.
125. Id. at 153.
126. Compare Patel, supra note 17, at 117 (“As it stands, an employee terminated based on a
security clearance denial or revocation is precluded from seeking substantive review of her
termination, whereas an employee terminated for any other reason can seek full review with the
MSPB. The Supreme Court’s decision in Egan is a roadblock to the rights of government
employees. Only congressional action amending the CSRA will effectively eliminate this
roadblock and guarantee a terminated employee MSPB review of the underlying security clearance
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the need to protect national security information.127 Furthermore, their approach
avoids addressing the separation of powers question that arises from each
clearance review. Those who support the Egan decision’s broad holding rely on
such shortcomings to defend their position.128 However, these supporters seem
to ignore that the decision in Webster allowed merit based reviews of
constitutional questions involving any adverse employment action, even if the
decision involves national security implications.129 The question remains: Can
the judiciary find a viable middle ground in modern security clearance law?
III. CURRENT SECURITY CLEARANCE JURISPRUDENCE OPENS THE DOOR FOR A
NEW APPROACH
A. The Hegab Background
The case of Hegab v. Long130 represents an opportunity for clarity in the
security clearance arena. After obtaining a top secret clearance in January of
2010, Mahmoud Hegab began orientation for his employment at the National

decisions that resulted in her termination.”), with Pollack, supra note 14, at 157 (“There is a delicate
balance between the interests of federal employees and national security. The interests of the
former must be protected, but such protection should not come at the expense of the latter. There
are alternative procedures that exist to protect federal employees without requiring judicial inquiry
into a sensitive security clearance issue. As a result, the Federal Circuit should separate itself from
security clearance questions.”), and Donovan, supra note 97, at 336 (“Assuming the Supreme Court
eventually holds security clearance determinations to be nonjusticiable . . . it will demonstrate the
Supreme Court’s recognition that the routine keeping of the nation’s secrets must, as a practical
matter, be entrusted to the executive branch.”).
127. See Patel, supra note 17, at 115.
128. See Pollack, supra note 14, at 152–53.
129. Id.; Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 604–05 (1988); see also Pollack, supra note 14, at
152–53.
130. 716 F.3d 790, 791 (4th Cir. 2013). In writing for the majority, Circuit Judge Niemeyer
explained the facts and history of the case as follows:
Hegab commenced this action under the Administrative Procedure Act against the NGA
and its Director to reverse the NGA’s decision, to reinstate his security clearance, and to
award him back pay, benefits, and attorneys’ fees. In his complaint, he alleged that he
presented “overwhelming evidence” to refute the NGA’s conclusions and that the NGA
staff “did not take the time or effort to review” the facts or “assumed that anything with
the name ‘Islam’ associated with it is a subversive terrorist organization.” He alleged
that “[i]f the latter is true . . . [his] constitutionally protected rights of freedom of religion,
freedom of expression, and freedom of association” were violated. The district court
dismissed Hegab’s complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), concluding
that it did not have subject-matter jurisdiction to review a security clearance
determination.
We conclude that Hegab’s speculative and conclusory allegations of constitutional
violations were essentially recharacterizations of his challenge to the merits of the NGA’s
security clearance determination and that we do not have jurisdiction to review such a
determination.
Id. (alteration in original).
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Geospatial Intelligence Agency (NGA).131 During the orientation, Hegab
disclosed to a security officer that he had married Bushra Nusairat following his
clearance investigation.132 The disclosure of new information prompted the
NGA to re-investigate Hegab’s clearance, and by November of the same year,
the agency issued a ruling revoking the clearance.133 The statement of reasons
released by the agency stated that Hegab and his wife’s association with foreign
governments and organizations “present[ed] an elevated foreign influence risk
that [wa]s problematic and unacceptable to the national security of the United
States.”134 Hegab appealed his revocation to the NGA and, after receiving a
final rejection in 2011, filed suit against the agency.135 Although Hegab
conceded that “courts are generally without subject-matter jurisdiction to review
an agency’s security clearance decision,”136 his suit alleged the revocation
violated his “constitutionally protected rights of freedom of religion, freedom of
expression, and freedom of association.”137
The district court dismissed Hegab’s claim, stating it did not have subject
matter jurisdiction.138 Hegab appealed that decision to the Fourth Circuit, which
concluded that the district court did not err in dismissing the former NGA

131. Id. at 791–92.
132. Id. at 792.
133. Id.
134. The complete list of reasons provided by NGA for the clearance re-investigation and
revocation were:
(1) that Hegab, his parents, and his siblings held dual citizenship with the United States
and Egypt; (2) that Hegab still possessed an Egyptian passport and that it would require
contact with foreign national government officials for Hegab to renounce his Egyptian
citizenship and turn in his passport, which would increase the potential that he would be
monitored by foreign intelligence services; (3) that Hegab stated that he was 80% certain
that his wife held dual citizenship with Jordan; (4) that Hegab reported “continuing
contact with multiple foreign nationals (including relatives), some of whom reside
outside of the Continental United States”; (5) that Hegab had reported residing in Egypt
from May 2004 to November 2007; (6) that Hegab’s spouse had attended and graduated
“from the Islamic Saudi Academy, whose curriculum, syllabus, and materials are
influenced, funded, and controlled by the Saudi government”; and (7) that “[i]nformation
available through open sources identifies [Hegab’s] spouse as being or having been
actively involved with one or more organizations which consist of groups who are
organized largely around their non-United States origin and/or their advocacy of or
involvement in foreign political issues.”
Id. (alteration in original).
135. Id. at 793.
136. Id. at 794. The court stated:
Both Hegab and the NGA appear to agree with the proposition that no one has a right to
a security clearance and that the grant of a security clearance is a highly discretionary act
of the Executive Branch. They also recognize that the Fourth Circuit has concluded that
security clearance determinations are generally not subject to judicial review.
Id. at 793.
137. Id. at 791.
138. Id. at 793.

208

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 67:189

employee’s claim.139 Writing for the majority, Judge Niemeyer concluded,
“Hegab’s constitutional allegations are conclusory only, resting on his
disagreement with the NGA’s decision on the merits.”140 Therefore, under the
Egan standard, the Fourth Circuit concluded that Hegab’s claim must be
dismissed because the judiciary does not have the authority to review the merits
or evidentiary conclusions of a security clearance decision.141
B. Finding a Middle Ground: The Hegab Approach
Although the Fourth Circuit’s holding was standard in security clearance
appeals, the concurring opinion written by Judge Motz proposed a solution on
how courts could “reconcile” the Egan and Webster decisions.142 Specifically,
she suggested that constitutional claims resulting from a clearance revocation or
denial could be subject to judicial review.143 In her concurring opinion, Judge
Motz opined:
If Egan stood alone, clearly it would require dismissal here too. But in
Webster v. Doe, decided the same term as Egan, the Supreme Court
appeared to hold, over vigorous dissents, that federal courts have
jurisdiction to review constitutional challenges to security-related
employment decisions. . . .
....
. . . In light of the holding in Egan, at most Webster permits judicial
review of a security clearance denial only when that denial results
from the application of an allegedly unconstitutional policy.144
Through her concurrence, Judge Motz offers an approach that will afford
constitutional protections to employees without significantly impeding upon the
Executive’s control of national security matters.145 By allowing reviews only of
unconstitutional policies, the court would be restricted to review only the merits
of the policy, rather than the specific factors that played a role in the denial or

139. See id. at 791.
140. Id. at 796.
141. Id. (“In its security clearance determination, the NGA concluded that Hegab had failed to
mitigate its concern of ‘an elevated foreign influence risk that is problematic and unacceptable to
the national security of the United States,’ and this conclusion is one in which the NGA ‘should
have the final say,’ and in which courts should not intrude.” (internal citation omitted) (quoting
Dep’t of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 529 (1988))).
142. Id. at 798 (Motz, J., concurring).
143. Id. at 797–98 (Motz, J., concurring).
144. Id. at 798 (Motz, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted). Although Judge Motz claims
unconstitutional policies should be subject to review, in that case, “Hegab allege[d] no
unconstitutional policy but only an assertedly unconstitutional individualized adverse
determination, [and therefore] his claim fail[ed].” Id. (Motz, J., concurring).
145. Id. (stating that “nothing in Webster indicates that it overruled Egan,” and that courts
could still assess the constitutionality of a policy claim “without delving into the merits of an
individualized security clearance determination”).
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revocation of an individual’s clearance.146 Such a limited review would keep
the judiciary from impinging on clear boundaries, which would otherwise risk
exposing national security secrets. In other words, specific decisions made
during an individual clearance review process would remain shielded from
scrutiny.
The concern within intelligence and security communities that reviewing
clearance revocations may expose sensitive materials can be assuaged by
judicial review that only focuses on internal policies.147 During these reviews,
the judiciary would have no need to request classified materials as the
proceeding would have no bearing on the individual’s conduct. Rather, the
court’s focus would be on the institutional policy that is alleged to have violated
the employee’s constitutional right. Thus, the court could provide protection for
an employee and render a decision that has no bearing on the sensitive material
involved in the agency’s revocation decision of an individual.
Additionally, agencies would be unable to promulgate arbitrary revocation
policies that restrict the constitutional rights of its employees. Judge Motz’s
opinion presents an opportunity for the federal courts to ensure that agencies are
not engaging in unlawful discrimination when establishing revocation policies.
Agencies would be required to ensure security clearance policies are in line with
federal law as a safeguard for individuals facing revocation.
Moreover, a change in posture from the federal judiciary would have the
added benefit of encouraging agency transparency when outlining security
clearance procedures. However, under this standard the courts would still be
able to afford deference to the agency by refusing to delve into the intricate
details of an individual’s revocation. Unlike other reformers, The Hegab
Approach sufficiently considers the national security concerns implicated in a
security clearance decision.148 The current clearance procedures have left many

146. Id.
147. Presumptively, prohibiting the judicial review of individual security clearance
determinations will limit the chances that sensitive material is exposed in the process. See id.
148. See Jason Rathod, Note, Not Peace, But a Sword: Navy v. Egan and the Case Against
Judicial Abdication in Foreign Affairs, 59 DUKE L.J. 595, 597–98 (2009). In that Note, the author
argued that,
lower courts [should] change course by reopening judicial review of the merits of security
clearance determinations, making injured plaintiffs whole, deterring future racial
discrimination, and avoiding a chilling effect on agency adjudicators.
In short, to reclaim its role in the United States’ system of separation of powers, the
judiciary should not use the Constitution to make peace with the political branches of
government, but rather, should wield it as a sword.
Id. at 635. However, the author fails to recognize the national security implications of a complete
and detailed review of the merits of a clearance revocation, as a “substantive review of a security
clearance revocation . . . creates a separation of powers issue by requiring an inquiry into a sensitive
area in which [the court] lacks expertise. This creates a risk that the security clearance system was
developed to prevent.” Pollack, supra note 14, at 155 (footnotes omitted).
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federal employees clouded by uncertainty following a revocation decision.149
Through a middle ground approach, the Supreme Court would establish a
consistent review policy that would effectively balance constitutional and
national security concerns.
IV. CONCLUSION
As security clearances come to the forefront of public debate for the first time,
the Supreme Court has the opportunity to grant clarity in clearance
jurisprudence. Through reconciling the decisions in Egan and Webster, the
Court can afford protection to employees while respecting the tenants of
Executive power. Refusing to apply Webster in the context of security clearance
decisions would continue to restrict the constitutional rights of employees facing
an adverse employment decision as the result of a denial or revocation.
The call to modernize security clearance jurisprudence post-Egan is long
overdue as the issue comes to light on the national stage for the first time. Now
is the time for the judiciary to shift course with the common sense Hegab
approach. Courts remaining on the current course in security clearance
jurisprudence will only lend more confusion to the issue and inadequate support
for the constitutional rights of employees requiring a clearance.
Although a noble idea, a complete overhaul of clearance reviews post-Egan,
would require the de-classification of sensitive materials and have the
unintended effect of harming national security. The new middle ground
approach established in the Hegab concurrence accomplishes the incredibly
difficult task of safeguarding national security, while also ensuring that the
constitutional rights of employees are protected. The Supreme Court would be
wise to adopt the approach taken by Judge Motz in Hegab and provide a
comprehensive solution to the problems that arise from a security clearance
dispute.

149. See Susan McGuire Smith, No Security Clearance, No Job, FEDSMITH (Aug. 13, 2015),
http://www.fedsmith.com/2015/08/13/no-security-clearance-no-job/.

